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BentoML is a Python library for building online serving systems optimized for AI apps and model inference
BentoML is a Python library for building online serving systems optimized for AI apps and model inference. Prior to 1.4.39, src/bentoml/_internal/container/frontend/dockerfile/templates/base_v2.j2 interpolates docker.base_image raw with no escaping, newline filtering, or validation. A malicious bento.yaml with a multi-line docker.base_image value smuggles arbitrary Dockerfile directives into the generated Dockerfile, and bentoml containerize then runs docker build which executes the injected RUN directives on the victim host. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.4.39.
bentomlCWE-78Insecure Permissions vulnerability in kvf-admin v1.0.0 allows a remote attacker to escalate privileges via the UserController.java component
Insecure Permissions vulnerability in kvf-admin v1.0.0 allows a remote attacker to escalate privileges via the UserController.java component
CWE-639Command injection in Raynet rvia RayVentory Scan Engine 12.6 Update 8 and previous versions allows adversaries to execute commands via ge...
Command injection in Raynet rvia RayVentory Scan Engine 12.6 Update 8 and previous versions allows adversaries to execute commands via getconfig, upload, inventory, and oracle options.
CWE-77Nx Console is the user interface for Nx & Lerna
Nx Console is the user interface for Nx & Lerna. On 19 May 2026, a malicious version of Nx Console, 18.95.0, was published at 12:30 PM UTC and removed soon after at 12:48 PM UTC, leaving it available for ~18 minutes in Visual Studio Marketplace. For OpenVSX, the problem was detected later, and the compromised version was available from 12:33 UTC to 13:09 UTC (~36 minutes). Version 18.100.0 of Nx Console is not compromised and users may remediate by upgrading to that version.
nxCWE-506RVF (formerly Remix Validated Form) provides easy form validation and state management for React
RVF (formerly Remix Validated Form) provides easy form validation and state management for React. From 6.0.0 to before 6.0.4 and 7.0.2, setPath in @rvf/set-get (used by @rvf/core to flatten incoming form data into a nested object) does not block the keys __proto__, constructor, or prototype when walking a path. Because field names in submitted form data are passed directly to setPath via preprocessFormData (and through parseFormData / validate), an attacker who can submit a form to a Remix / React Router app using the library can set arbitrary properties on Object.prototype of the running server process. This is a default-reachable prototype pollution primitive: no special configuration is required. Any endpoint that accepts a form via parseFormData or runs a validator created with createValidator is affected. This vulnerability is fixed in 6.0.4 and 7.0.2.
CWE-1321Ella Core is a 5G core designed for private networks
Ella Core is a 5G core designed for private networks. Prior to 1.10.0, a radio with a valid NG Setup can send a forged PDUSessionResourceSetupResponse carrying any UE's AMF-UE-NGAP-ID. Ella Core does not verify the message arrived on the SCTP association bound to that UE's logical NG-connection, then creates a GTP tunnel towards that radio. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.10.0.
CWE-358CWE-863free5GC is an open-source implementation of the 5G core network
free5GC is an open-source implementation of the 5G core network. Prior to 4.2.2, free5GC's NEF mounts the nnef-pfdmanagement route group without inbound OAuth2/bearer-token authorization. A network attacker who can reach NEF on the SBI can use a forged or arbitrary bearer token (e.g. Authorization: Bearer not-a-real-token) to read PFD application data via GET /applications and GET /applications/{appID}, and to create or delete PFD change-notification subscriptions via POST /subscriptions and DELETE /subscriptions/{subID}. Same root cause as the other NEF SBI findings: the route group is mounted without any inbound auth middleware. Unlike the OAM and traffic-influence groups, nnef-pfdmanagement IS declared in the runtime ServiceList, so this is the production-intended path that operators expect to be protected by OAuth2 setting receive from NRF: true -- and it is not. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.2.
free5gcCWE-863free5GC is an open-source implementation of the 5G core network
free5GC is an open-source implementation of the 5G core network. Prior to 4.2.2, free5GC's SMF mounts the UPI management route group without OAuth2/bearer-token authorization middleware. A network attacker who can reach SMF on the SBI can hit UPI endpoints with no Authorization header at all, and the requests reach the SMF business handlers. In the running Docker lab this was directly demonstrated for read (GET /upi/v1/upNodesLinks), write (POST /upi/v1/upNodesLinks with attacker-controlled UP-node and link payload), and delete (DELETE /upi/v1/upNodesLinks/{nodeID}) operations. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.2.
free5gcCWE-306CWE-862free5GC is an open-source implementation of the 5G core network
free5GC is an open-source implementation of the 5G core network. Prior to 4.2.2, free5GC's SMF mounts the UPI management route group without inbound OAuth2 middleware. On top of that, the DELETE /upi/v1/upNodesLinks/{upNodeRef} handler unconditionally dereferences upNode.UPF after the type-guarded async release, even though AN-typed nodes are constructed without a UPF object. As a result, a single unauthenticated DELETE /upi/v1/upNodesLinks/gNB1 request crashes the handler with a nil-pointer panic AND mutates the in-memory user-plane topology before panicking (the UpNodeDelete(upNodeRef) line runs first). This is an unauthenticated, state-mutating panic-DoS sink that an off-path network attacker can trigger by name against any AN entry. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.2.
free5gcCWE-306CWE-476free5GC is an open-source implementation of the 5G core network
free5GC is an open-source implementation of the 5G core network. Prior to 4.2.2, free5GC's NEF mounts the nnef-oam route group without inbound OAuth2/bearer-token authorization. A network attacker who can reach NEF on the SBI can hit the OAM route with no Authorization header at all and the handler returns 200 OK. The current OAM handler is a stub that returns null, but the structural defect is route-group-scoped: the entire OAM route group has no inbound auth middleware, so every future OAM operation added to this group inherits the missing auth boundary by default. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.2.
free5gcCWE-306CWE-862free5GC is an open-source implementation of the 5G core network
free5GC is an open-source implementation of the 5G core network. Prior to 4.2.2, free5GC's NEF mounts the 3gpp-traffic-influence API without inbound OAuth2/bearer-token authorization. A network attacker who can reach NEF on the SBI can create, read, patch, and delete traffic-influence subscriptions either with no Authorization header at all, or with a forged bearer token (e.g. Authorization: Bearer not-a-real-token). This includes creating AnyUeInd=true subscriptions intended to affect group / any-UE traffic steering. The route group is also reachable even when the running config's ServiceList does not declare it, so operators who think they disabled the service via config are still exposed. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.2.
free5gcCWE-862free5GC is an open-source implementation of the 5G core network
free5GC is an open-source implementation of the 5G core network. Prior to 4.2.2, free5GC's NRF root SBI endpoint POST /oauth2/token contains a parser-level type-confusion bug family. The handler in NFs/nrf/internal/sbi/api_accesstoken.go reflects over models.NrfAccessTokenAccessTokenReq, special-cases only plain string and NrfNfManagementNfType fields, and treats every other field as if it were a single models.PlmnId. The parsed *models.PlmnId is then assigned with reflect.Value.Set() to whichever field name the attacker put in the form body, which panics whenever the destination field's real type is incompatible (slice, different struct, primitive). Gin recovery converts each panic into HTTP 500, but the endpoint remains remotely panicable from a single unauthenticated form-encoded request and is repeatedly triggerable. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.2.
free5gcCWE-20CWE-755free5GC is an open-source implementation of the 5G core network
free5GC is an open-source implementation of the 5G core network. Prior to 4.2.2, free5GC's NEF PATCH /3gpp-pfd-management/v1/{afId}/transactions/{transId}/applications/{appId} handler panics with a nil-pointer dereference when the upstream UDR call fails AND the consumer wrapper returns err != nil together with a nil *ProblemDetails. The handler's errPfdData != nil branch builds its own problemDetailsErr correctly, but immediately after it reads problemDetails.Cause (the OTHER value, which is nil in this branch) and panics. Gin recovery converts the panic into HTTP 500, so a single PATCH against this endpoint returns 500 instead of the intended controlled error response whenever UDR access is failing. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.2.
free5gcCWE-476CWE-754free5GC is an open-source implementation of the 5G core network
free5GC is an open-source implementation of the 5G core network. Prior to 4.2.2, free5GC's SMF mounts the UPI management route group without inbound OAuth2 middleware. The POST /upi/v1/upNodesLinks create-or-update handler accepts attacker-controlled JSON and passes it directly into UpNodesFromConfiguration(), which calls logger.InitLog.Fatalf(...) on several validation failures. One confirmed path is the UE-IP-pool overlap check: a single unauthenticated POST that adds a new UPF whose pool overlaps an existing UPF terminates the entire SMF process (docker ps shows Exited (1)), not just the goroutine. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.2.
free5gcCWE-306CWE-617free5GC is an open-source implementation of the 5G core network
free5GC is an open-source implementation of the 5G core network. Prior to 4.2.2, free5GC's NEF mounts the nnef-callback route group without inbound OAuth2/bearer-token authorization. A forged or arbitrary bearer token (e.g. Authorization: Bearer not-a-real-token) is enough to reach the SMF-callback handler -- the callback body is parsed and dispatched into NEF business logic instead of being rejected at the auth boundary. Same root cause as the other NEF SBI findings: the route group is mounted without any inbound auth middleware. NEF does not authenticate the producer NF identity before processing callback content; if an attacker can guess or obtain a valid NotifId, this missing auth boundary lets forged callbacks act on real subscription state. The route group is also reachable even when the runtime ServiceList does not declare it (it lists only nnef-pfdmanagement and nnef-oam). This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.2.
free5gcCWE-306CWE-862free5GC is an open-source implementation of the 5G core network
free5GC is an open-source implementation of the 5G core network. Prior to 4.2.2, free5GC's NEF terminates the entire process when a stored PFD-subscription notifyUri cannot be reached. In PfdChangeNotifier.FlushNotifications(), the notifier calls NnefPFDmanagementNotify(...) and on any delivery error invokes logger.PFDManageLog.Fatal(err), which is os.Exit(1)-equivalent in Go. An attacker who can create a PFD subscription with an attacker-chosen notifyUri and then trigger a PFD change can deterministically kill NEF on the asynchronous delivery attempt -- the process exits with status 1, dropping NEF's entire SBI surface until restart. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.2.
free5gcCWE-20CWE-617free5GC is an open-source implementation of the 5G core network
free5GC is an open-source implementation of the 5G core network. Prior to 4.2.2, free5GC's PCF POST /npcf-smpolicycontrol/v1/sm-policies handler (HandleCreateSmPolicyRequest) panics with a nil-pointer dereference when a downstream OpenAPI consumer call (UDR lookup) returns 404 Not Found and the consumer wrapper returns err != nil together with a nil response struct. The handler logs the OpenAPI error and continues executing instead of returning, then dereferences the nil response struct on a subsequent line and panics. Gin recovery converts the panic into HTTP 500, so a single attacker-shaped POST returns 500 instead of a clean 4xx whenever the downstream lookup fails. The PCF process keeps running. The trigger is a single POST containing input that causes the downstream UDR lookup to fail (e.g. an unknown DNN). In 4.2.1 this endpoint is also reachable WITHOUT an Authorization header because the PCF Npcf_SMPolicyControl route group is mounted without inbound auth middleware. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.2.
free5gcCWE-476CWE-754free5GC is an open-source implementation of the 5G core network
free5GC is an open-source implementation of the 5G core network. Prior to 4.2.2, free5GC's NEF mounts the 3gpp-pfd-management API without inbound OAuth2/bearer-token authorization. A network attacker who can reach NEF on the SBI can create, read, and delete PFD-management transaction state with a forged or arbitrary bearer token (e.g. Authorization: Bearer not-a-real-token). The route group is also reachable even when the running config's ServiceList does not declare it, so operators who think they disabled the service via config are still exposed. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.2.
free5gcCWE-862Improper Certificate Validation vulnerability in Erlang OTP public_key (pubkey_cert and public_key modules) allows a DNS nameConstraints ...
Improper Certificate Validation vulnerability in Erlang OTP public_key (pubkey_cert and public_key modules) allows a DNS nameConstraints bypass via subject CommonName fallback in TLS hostname verification. Two flaws combine to allow a subordinate CA whose DNS nameConstraints are restricted (e.g. permitted;DNS:allowed.example.com) to issue a leaf certificate that an OTP TLS client accepts as a valid identity for an out-of-scope hostname (e.g. victim.example.com): First, pubkey_cert:validate_names/6 in lib/public_key/src/pubkey_cert.erl only checks SAN DNS entries against nameConstraints. Per RFC 5280, a permitted DNS subtree only restricts certificates that contain a DNS-typed name. A leaf with no subjectAltName therefore trivially satisfies any permitted;DNS:... constraint regardless of its subject commonName. Second, public_key:pkix_verify_hostname/3 in lib/public_key/src/public_key.erl falls back to the subject commonName when no subjectAltName is present, extracting id-at-commonName attributes as presented IDs and matching them against the reference hostname. The strict pkix_verify_hostname_match_fun(https) matcher does not suppress this fallback. The result is that path validation accepts a CN-only leaf under a DNS-constrained intermediate (no SAN means the nameConstraints are not triggered), and hostname verification then accepts it via the CN fallback. The bypass is reachable from stock ssl:connect with verify_peer, a trusted CA, SNI, and the canonical strict https hostname matcher. This issue affects OTP from OTP 19.3 before OTP 26.2.5.21, 27.3.4.12, 28.5.0.1, and 29.0.1 corresponding to public_key from 1.4 before 1.15.1.7, 1.17.1.3, 1.20.3.1, and 1.21.1.
erlangCWE-295CWE-297free5GC is an open-source implementation of the 5G core network
free5GC is an open-source implementation of the 5G core network. Prior to 4.2.2, the free5GC UDM component fails to validate the supi path parameter in six GET handlers of the nudm-sdm (Subscriber Data Management) service. An unauthenticated attacker can inject control characters into the SUPI parameter, causing UDM to forward a malformed request to UDR and return a 500 Internal Server Error response that exposes internal infrastructure details. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.2.
free5gcCWE-20CWE-209
8.8 HIGH
9.8 CRITICALWeekly digest
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