CVE Watch
Every published CVE, mapped to engagement reality.
Crawled from cve.org every day. Each entry annotated with the QSearch coverage signal — how many of our agents, skills, and playbooks address the technique. Subscribe via RSS for SIEM pipe, or get the weekly digest by email.
A flaw was found in assisted-migration-agent
A flaw was found in assisted-migration-agent. An unauthenticated attacker, located on the same local area network (LAN), can exploit a path traversal vulnerability. By crafting a specially designed gzipped tarball, the attacker can bypass security checks and write arbitrary files to the system. This could ultimately lead to the execution of unauthorized code on the appliance.
CWE-59A flaw was found in assisted-migration-agent
A flaw was found in assisted-migration-agent. The application hardcodes insecure Transport Layer Security (TLS) connections when communicating with vCenter. This vulnerability allows a Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacker to intercept and harvest vCenter administrator credentials. This can lead to unauthorized access to vCenter.
CWE-295A flaw was found in migration-planner
A flaw was found in migration-planner. A remote authenticated attacker could exploit this vulnerability by uploading a specially crafted RVTools .xlsx file. Due to improper input sanitization, malicious SQL embedded within a spreadsheet cell is executed when cluster names are processed. This SQL Injection allows for arbitrary file reading on the system, potentially exposing sensitive information such as Kubernetes service account tokens and other credentials, which could lead to a full compromise of the SaaS environment.
CWE-89A flaw was found in migration-planner-ui-app
A flaw was found in migration-planner-ui-app. An attacker can register a malicious discovery agent with a specially crafted credentialUrl containing JavaScript code. When an organizational user clicks this link in the user interface, the embedded malicious code executes within the user's browser session. This cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability allows the attacker to compromise the victim's Red Hat Single Sign-On (SSO) session, potentially leading to unauthorized cross-tenant data access and API actions.
CWE-79A flaw was found in migration-planner
A flaw was found in migration-planner. The agent-API middleware processes JSON Web Tokens (JWTs) for authentication, but its UpdateSourceInventory and UpdateAgentStatus handlers fail to validate the source_id claim within these tokens against the requested source ID. This oversight allows an authenticated attacker with a valid agent token to manipulate data across different tenants, leading to a complete collapse of tenant isolation. This could result in unauthorized overwriting of victim inventory, planting of malicious credential URLs, or corruption of migration assessments.
CWE-639A flaw was found in migration-planner
A flaw was found in migration-planner. An authenticated attacker could exploit an improper access control vulnerability in the `/api/v1/sources/{id}/image-url` endpoint. This flaw allows the attacker to bypass an ownership check and obtain presigned S3 URLs for Open Virtual Appliance (OVA) images belonging to other users. Consequently, the attacker can download OVA images containing sensitive information, such as long-lived agent JSON Web Tokens (JWTs) and source configurations, potentially leading to unauthorized access and modification of the victim's source.
CWE-639A flaw was found in migration-planner
A flaw was found in migration-planner. An authenticated user can exploit this vulnerability by sending a DELETE request to the /api/v1/sources route, which lacks proper authorization and filtering. This allows for the destruction of all customer data, including sources, agents, and assessments, leading to a critical loss of availability and integrity across the entire SaaS platform.
CWE-306Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers
Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, POST /config/versions/<service>/<server_ip>/<configver>/save interpolates the URL-path configver parameter directly into a config-version path that ends up at os.system(f"dos2unix -q {cfg}"). configver is not run through EscapedString (Pydantic doesn't validate path segments declared as str) and the surrounding .. block is the broken tuple-membership patch from GHSA-vapt-004. An authenticated user with role <= 3 ("user") therefore reaches a bin/sh -c command-injection sink. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.
CWE-78Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers
Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, GET /history/<service>/<server_ip> re-uses the server_ip path parameter as a user-id when service == 'user', with no authorization check. Any authenticated user — even a guest in an unrelated group — can list any other user's full action audit trail (server IPs touched, configs deployed, services restarted). At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.
CWE-639CWE-863Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers
Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, the /smon/agent/{version,uptime,status,checks}/<server_ip> family of routes takes the URL path component verbatim into requests.get(f'http://{server_ip}:{agent_port}/...'). The path component is constrained only by Flask's default URL converter, which permits any value (including IPv4 literals like 169.254.169.254, RFC1918 ranges, and 127.0.0.1). At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.
CWE-918Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers
Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, wrap_line (app/modules/common/common.py:181-186) and highlight_word (app/modules/common/common.py:188-192) build raw HTML by string concatenation with no escaping. The frontend (app/static/js/script.js, log-viewer paths) uses .html(data) / .append(data) to inject the response body. Anyone able to write a line into a managed HAProxy/Nginx access log (i.e. anyone who can send an HTTP request to the public LB) can land an <svg/onload=…> payload that executes when a Roxy-WI admin opens the log viewer. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.
CWE-79Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers
Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, get_ldap_email (app/modules/roxywi/user.py:120-157) builds the LDAP search filter via f-string concatenation. The username URL path parameter is taken verbatim — no checkAjaxInput, no LDAP escape — and inserted, a username like *)(mail=*)(cn=* injects additional clauses, allowing the admin to enumerate or harvest attributes outside the intended record. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.
CWE-90Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers
Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, the HAProxy section-save endpoints (POST /api/service/haproxy/<server_id>/section/<section_type> and the PUT / global / defaults variants) accept a JSON option field that is not validated, not escaped, and is rendered verbatim into the generated HAProxy configuration via the section.j2, global.j2, and defaults.j2 Ansible templates. Because Roxy-WI then pushes the generated config to the load balancer and runs systemctl reload haproxy, an authenticated user with role ≤ 3 (user) can inject arbitrary HAProxy directives into the config that runs on every load balancer their group manages — including option external-check + external-check command /bin/bash -c '…', which gives remote code execution on the load balancer as the haproxy user on every health-check tick. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.
CWE-20CWE-77Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers
Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, POST /waf/<service>/<server_ip>/rule/<rule_id>/save accepts a config_file_name form field that is passed straight through to config_mod.master_slave_upload_and_restart(...) as the destination path. The validation chain (_replace_config_path_to_correct → check_is_conf) only requires the path to contain a hard-coded service substring (nginx/haproxy/apache2/httpd/keepalived) and the substring conf or cfg, and to not contain ... The encoded-slash substitution 92 → / is applied before the substring check, so the attacker can build any absolute path anywhere on the LB filesystem as long as it satisfies those substring constraints. The body of the WAF rule (config form field) is written verbatim to that path. By choosing a filename like 92etc92cron.d92nginx_cfg_evil (resolving to /etc/cron.d/nginx_cfg_evil), an attacker drops a cron entry on the load balancer with attacker-controlled content. Cron parses the file on its next scan, executing the embedded job as root — full RCE on every load balancer the caller's group manages. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.
CWE-20CWE-22Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers
Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, the install blueprint declares only bp.before_request → @jwt_required() (app/routes/install/routes.py:36-39). The individual endpoints install_exporter, install_waf, install_geoip, check_geoip, get_exporter_version, and get_task_status are not wrapped in page_for_admin and do not call roxywi_common.is_user_has_access_to_its_group(server_ip) or check_is_server_in_group(server_ip). Only the GET index page (install_monitoring) gates on roxywi_auth.page_for_admin(level=2). Because the missing decorators omit both role and group checks, any logged-in user — including the default guest role 4 — can install/reconfigure exporters, WAF, and GeoIP databases on every server in the Roxy-WI database, regardless of tenant ownership. The Ansible playbooks run with the per-server SSH credential stored in Roxy-WI, which the credentials' rightful owner (a different tenant) has provisioned with sudo rights for the management workflow. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.
CWE-639CWE-862Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers
Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, PUT /smon/check (app/routes/smon/routes.py:117-138) gates only on roxywi_common.check_user_group_for_flask() — which validates that the caller has some group, not that the target check_id belongs to it. The downstream SQL update functions update_smon, update_smonHttp, update_smonTcp, update_smonPing, update_smonDns (app/modules/db/smon.py:515-562) all execute WHERE smon_id = ? with no user_group filter. The DELETE path is correctly filtered (app/modules/db/smon.py:319-327 does WHERE id = ? AND user_group = ?), demonstrating that the maintainers know the right pattern but did not apply it on UPDATE. Therefore any authenticated user can iterate over smon_id values and silently rewrite any other tenant's HTTP / TCP / Ping / DNS monitoring check. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.
CWE-639CWE-862Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers
Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, agent_action (app/routes/smon/agent_routes.py:166-179) has decorators @bp.post('/agent/action/<action>') and @jwt_required() only — no role check, no group ownership check on the server_ip form field. Any authenticated user, including role 4 (guest), can start, stop, or restart the roxy-wi-smon-agent systemd unit on any server they can name. Roxy-WI executes the systemd action over its own SSH credentials (passwordless sudo), so the action runs as root on the target. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.
CWE-862CWE-863A heap buffer overflow flaw was found in 389 Directory Server
A heap buffer overflow flaw was found in 389 Directory Server. When serializing objectclass definitions, the oc_superior (SUP) field length is omitted from buffer size calculations in read_schema_dse() and schema_oc_to_string(), but the field is still written via strcat(). An attacker with Directory Manager privileges, or a compromised replication supplier, can trigger a server crash by creating objectclasses with long SUP values. This is an incomplete fix variant of CVE-2025-14905.
CWE-122During an internal security assessment, a potential out-of-bounds write vulnerability was discovered in the BIOS of some ThinkPad product...
During an internal security assessment, a potential out-of-bounds write vulnerability was discovered in the BIOS of some ThinkPad products could allow a privileged local user to execute code in System Management Mode (SMM).
CWE-787During an internal security assessment, a potential vulnerability was discovered in some ThinkPad embedded controller firmware that could...
During an internal security assessment, a potential vulnerability was discovered in some ThinkPad embedded controller firmware that could allow a privileged local user to perform arbitrary reads or writes to privileged memory regions.
CWE-327
9.6 CRITICAL
7.3 HIGH
4.3 MEDIUMWeekly digest
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